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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was convicted of Grand Larceny. The charge 
was, in substance, that she stole a check belonging to Box 
Elder High School at Brigham City, Utah, cashed the check, 
and kept the money. 
Counsel for appellant states his version of the facts 
and after a brief resume of the activities of the defendant, 
Miss C. Jean Shonka, as to her handling of a certain check 
in the amount of $300.55, declares "upon all of this there 
is no dispute 
otherwise. 
* * * " Respondent reads the record 
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Miss Shonka was an employee of the Board of Educa-
tion of Box Elder County from September, 1945, until 
December 23, 1952, upon which later date she, by request, 
resigned. Miss Shonka had been employed as a secretary 
and office employee of the Box Elder High School and as 
her years of employment passed, certain other duties were 
assigned to her which eventually included that of handling 
the funds of the school, keeping the books, making deposits 
and joining with the high school principal as a co-signer of 
checks drawn on school funds. 
For reasons not fully disclosed by the record, Miss 
Shonka was relieved of the responsibility of receipting for 
and depositing school funds on or about January 2, 1952 
(R. 211), and she had been theretofore relieved of her re-
sponsibility for opening the school mail (R. 35-36). The 
principal of the school, Mr. Freeman, assumed the respon-
sibility for opening the mail and a Mr. Austin Larson, mem-
ber of the faculty, assumed the obligation of receipting for, 
handling and banking the school funds (R. 35). It would 
appear that, subsequent to the date of these changes, the 
extent of Miss Shonka's authority to handle funds was 
limited to a so-called "petty cash" fund in the amount of 
$25.00 which, when depleted, would be reimbursed by means 
of a check drawn against the school funds, signed by Miss 
Shonka and countersigned by Mr. Freeman. 
In preparing for the registration of students to be 
conducted on the 25th, 26th and 27th of August, 1952, Miss 
Shonka performed certain duties for the accomplishment 
thereof. She states that knowing money would be neces-
sary for registering the students, she went to the file draw-
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ers in the vault room to obtain change for that purpose (R. 
212) but, as says appellant's counsel, "the cupboard was 
bare." However, it was in fact only bare of silver and cur-
rency, for lVIiss Shonka says she therein found a check (R. 
212). This check represented a reimbursement to the Box 
Elder High School for funds they had expended in their 
participation in the State High School Basketball Tourna-
ment of 1952 and the check bore the date of March 28, 1952. 
Miss Shonka had been, as heretofore related, relieved of 
her responsibility to handle the funds of the school as of 
January 2, 1952, but she nevertheless found it expeditious 
to take this said check in the amount of $300.55 to the bank 
on the 21st day of August, 1952, and there cash it. Having 
admittedly done so, Miss Shonka informed the court and 
jury that she placed the funds received, ten $20 bills, four 
$10 bills, ten $5 bills, together with $10.55 in silver, in a 
bag which she had taken with her to the bank (R. 213), 
and that she then returned to the high school and placed 
the bag in the third drawer of a steel filing cabinet where 
it was left until a Monday morning, August 25th (R. 214). 
On that Monday morning, according to Miss Shonka, she 
removed from the bag two $10 bills, four $5 bills and $10 
in silver (R. 215) for the purpose of making up a "change 
box" for the registration activities (R. 214). Thereafter, 
apparently on the morning of the third day of registration, 
Miss Shonka contends that she took $50 from the "change 
box", of which she put $20 back in the money bag in the 
vault and put the remaining $30 into another cash box for 
registration purposes on that day (R. 222). Then on the 
morning of August 28th, Miss Shonka says, she took $30 
from the second change box which she deposited back in 
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the money bag which was still in the third drawer in the 
filing case in the vault (R. 224). Thereafter, she never saw 
it again (R. 226). 
Miss Shonka says, as to her further conduct, that she 
never mentioned her finding of this $300.55 check to any-
one (R. 268) ; that she knew it was from the Utah High 
School Activities Association (R. 273) ; that she knew Mr. 
Larson was supposed to receipt for it (R. 274) ; that she 
knew she should have had a receipt for it (R. 274); that 
she knew it was Mr. Larson's duty to deposit it in the bank 
(R. 274) ; that she knew she had not entered it upon the 
school books (R. 274); that she knew the school books 
would not balance if she did not make the entry (R. 274, 
275); that she had never prior to this hearing ever men-
tioned to any school official that she had cashed the check 
for change for registration or any other purpose (R. 275). 
Miss Shonka further stated that there was no record of an 
entry or notation concerning the item of $300.55 in any 
of her books or records ( R. 279) . From the 28th day of 
August, 1952, until the time of the termination of her em-
ployment, December 23, 1952, Miss Shonka claimed no con-
cern for this sizeable amount of money. This irrespective 
of the fact that on prior occasions her desk had been pil-
fered (R. 267, 269) and the police had been called in (R. 
268) . The record further shows that Miss Shonka had been 
called upon for a personal accounting in the forepart of 
October, 1952 (R. 263) ; that she did not reply to such a 
request (R. 264) ; and that she was given an ultimatum 
that she, account by December 19 or be dismissed (R. 278); 
nor did she meet the terms of this ultimatum but, "* * * 
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I dropped the matter because I figured I was complying 
with one or the other of their requests by resigning." 
From the testimony of Miss Shonka alone, the jury 
could only find that her accounts and books were not in 
order and that she declined to account therefore. 
Thus, even though the jury had accepted as true the 
full testimony of Miss Shonka, they could not help but 
entertain a reasonable doubt as to her culpability. 
There was further evidence adduced not consistent 
with Miss Shonka's testimony. Norman Jeppsen, a teacher 
at Box Elder High School, testified that he received no 
funds from Miss Shonka for the purpose of making change 
(R. 324) ; so testified Delmont Beecher, also a teacher (R. 
354) ; nor did Helen Smith Pierce recall that when she 
commenced her duty registering students, she received any 
change (R. 368) ; Norwood Hyer, also a teacher, registered 
students and was furnished no change for such purpose 
(R. 370) ; nor was L. D. Wilde furnished any moneys for 
the purpose of making change (R. 381). These are the 
employees of the Box Elder High· School who conducted the 
registration of the students of that school on the 25th, 26th 
and 27th of August, 1952. They say not what Miss Shonka 
says. 
Too, there was testimony to the effect that a certified 
public accountant, doing an independent audit, was unable 
to find any trace of the check or the proceeds of the check 
to the school's credit (R. 164-165). And, also, the school's 
treasurer, Mr. Larson, to whom had been delegated the 
function of receiving all moneys which came into the school, 
never received either the check or the proceeds (R. 119). 
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We deem the facts sufficient to sustain the verdict. It 
was the judgment and sentence of the court that the de-
fendant be incarcerated in the State Prison for not less 
than one nor more than ten years. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE CASE PRESENTED AND THE EVI-
DENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE SUS-
TAINS THE CHARGE OF GRAND LARCENY 
AND THE CAUSE WAS PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 




THE CASE PRESENTED AND THE EVI-
DENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE SU~ 
T'AINS THE CHARGE OF GRAND LARCENY 
AND THE CAUSE WAS PROPERLY SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY. 
Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, 
leading or driving away the personal property of another. 
Section 76-38-1, U. C. A. 1953. 
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Appellant's contention here is, as we construe the brief 
of appellant on this Point I, that the evidence presented in 
this cause was insufficient to show a felonious taking as a 
matter of law and therefore not a question of fact for the 
jury. 
Appellant claims: 
"Upon the evidence of the state, without con-
sidering that of the defendant, herself, we contended 
and do contend that there were not sufficient facts 
or inference from facts to warrant a finding that 
the defendant had a felonious intent in cashing the 
check, or that she had a felonious intent in carry-
ing the money out of the bank. * * *" 
"The check was, in full day light, cashed on 
August 21, 1952. * * *" 
"There was not the slightest element of con-
cealment by the defendant. * * *" 
"It has been held by this Honorable Court in 
several cases and throughout the time of the Court, 
that it is the duty of the judge, upon a trial for 
grand larceny to take the case from the jury when 
the evidence is insufficient to show a felonious tak-
ing." 
The State concedes and this Court has held, People v. 
Miller, 4 Utah 410, 11 P. 514; State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 
189 P. 84; that there must be an intent to steal at the time 
of the taking and that intent is a necessary element of the 
crime of larceny. However, 
"* * * intent is not always disclosed by what 
one says, but also is determined by what one says 
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and does, or fails to say or do in [a] given situation, 
together with other facts and circumstances sur-
rounding [the] transaction." 
Loper v. U. S., 160 Fed. 2d 293. 
So, Miss Shonka's having gone openly to the bank to 
exchange the check for cash is not sufficient to disprove 
a felonious intent in the face of her further unsatisfactory 
explanation of the disposition of the funds she thus ob-
tained. 
As the State reads appellant's authorities: State v. 
Nelson, 39 Utah 238, 117 P. 71; State v. Morrell, 39 Utah 
498, 118 P. 215; State v. Allen, supra; Akins v. State, 12 
Okla. Cr. 269, 154 P. 1007; State v. Morris, 70 Utah 570, 
262 P. 107; all of these cases concern themselves with the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and to 
prove a felonious taking. Despite the syllabus to which ap-
pellant refers in the case of State v. Morris, supra, this is 
the question in that case that the court ask of itse1f, "Was 
the evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction?" 
(70 Utah at 576.) There can be no doubt that the rule an-
nounced in the cases referred to is correct as applied to the 
facts of those cases. These cases are not, however, author-
ity for the proposition "that it is the duty of the judge, upon 
a trial for grand larceny, to take the case from the jury 
when the evidence is insufficient to show a felonious tak-
ing," for which appellant contends. We would be the first 
to concede that in the absence of any question of fact, there 
would be no function for the jury to perform. Such is not 
here the case. 
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Appellant further contends, that: 
"By the verdict of not guilty of embezzlement, 
the jury determined, and so said, that they were not 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant converted the money, $300.55 received by her 
upon the check, to her own use; and furthermore, 
the jury were not satisfied, and so said by their 
verdict, that she had a felonious intent to appropri-
ate it to her own use, and to deprive the owner of it." 
.Such a contention will not bear investigation for the very 
reason that there is a distinction, which we thing appellant 
over looks, between possession and custody of property ; 
which makes for a distinction between "larceny" and "em-
bezzlement". 
"Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation 
of property by a person to whom it has been in-
trusted.'' 
Section 76-17-1, U. C. A. 1953. 
On and after January 2, 1952, Miss Shonka ceased to act 
in a fiduciary capacity as recipient of funds for the school. 
When she, on the 21st day of August, 1952, took, endorsed 
and cashed the check, she took into her possession funds 
that had not been intrusted to her. We suggest that the 
jury found her not guilty of embezzlement because of the 
fact that she did not come into possession of the check 
under any color of right to possession thereof whatsoever 
and that she could not have "fraudulently appropriated" 
as a person to whom it had been intrusted. This finding 
was not a bar to the further finding that she took some-
thing that did not belong to her; that her act in taking the 
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check was larcenous so that she was guilty of feloniously 
"stealing" from her employer. For a general treatment of 
the distinction between possession and custody of property 
consult 32 Am. Jur. 958, Larceny, Section 56, wherein it 
is said: 
"The rule was laid down that where one having only 
the bare charge or custody of property for the owner 
converts it animo furandi, he commits a trespass 
and is guilty of larceny, the possession, in judgment 
of law, remaining in the owner until the conversion. 
This is the rule at common law and under statutes 
declaratory of the common law." 
It was said in Commonwealth v. Hays, (1859) 14 Gray 
(Mass.) 62, 7 4 Am. Dec. 662 : 
"The statutes relating to embezzlement, both in this 
country and in England, had their origin in a de-
sign to supply a defect which was found to exist in 
the criminal law. By reason of nice and subtle dis-
tinctions, which the courts of law had recognized 
and sanctioned, it was difficult to reach and punish 
the fraudulent taking and appropriation of money 
and chattels by persons exercising certain trades 
and occupations, by virtue of which they held a re-
lation of confidence or trust towards their employ-
ers or principals, and thereby became possessed of 
their property. In such cases the moral guilt was 
the same as if the offender had been guilty of an 
actual felonious taking; but in many cases he could 
not be convicted of larceny, because the property 
which had been fraudulently converted was lawfully 
in his possession by virtue of his employment, and 
there was not that technical taking or asportation 
which is essential to the proof of the crime of lar-
ceny .... The statutes relating to embezzlement 
W'ere intended to embrace this class of offenses and 
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it may be said generally that they do not apply to 
cases where the element of a breach of trust or con-
fidence in the fraudulent conv·ersion of money or 
chattels is not shown to exist." (Emphasis added.) 
The jury correctly ruled out embezzlement and just as cor-
rectly decided by its verdict that larceny had been com-
mitted. 
For a comprehensive annotation on the distinction be-
tween larceny and embezzlement, see 146 A. L. R. 532 and 
the authorities there cited. 
Miss .Shonka was not guilty of a breach of trust, for 
.. 
she had no trust imposed upon her at the time of the tak-
ing; but, Miss Shonka was guilty of the theft of the check 
and the jury did and well could find that at the time of the 
taking there was a felonious intent. 
POINT II 
THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 8 WAS 
WITHOUT ERROR. 
The court instructed the jury : 
"Every person who finds lost property under cir-
cumstances which give him knowledge of a means of 
inquiry as to the true owner, and who appropriates 
such property to his own use * * *, without 
first making reasonable and just efforts to find the 
owner and restore the property to him, is guilty of 
larceny." 
These are, along with the deletion, the words of the statute, 
Section 76-38-2, U. C. A. 1953. 
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Appellant claims for objection to this instruction that: 
"* * * The entire account and all of the e·vidence 
as to where the check was and where the money 
went comes from the mouth of the defendant. 
"This testimony is undisputed. The check was 
found in a filing cabinet of the high school, cashed 
by the bank, and the money, and all of it, placed and 
left by the hand of the defendant where the check 
was, namely, in the possession of the true owner, as 
she, probably as. well as anyone, knew." 
The jury was at liberty to believe or disbelieve that which 
"comes from the mouth of the defenda:q.t ;" and they were 
so instructed. (Instruction No. 15.) The court also in-
structed the jury : 
"* * * If an instruction applies only to a state 
of facts which you find does not exist, you will dis-
regard the instruction. * * *" (Instruction No. 
17.) 
Instruction No. 8 does not stand alone, unexplained and 
unqualified. The jury r~ay have believed Miss Shonka 
when she said she found the check on the "west side of the 
third drawer of the steel file in the vault room." If so, Miss 
Shonka was a finder of lost property, and the instruction 
was proper. If not, and the jury found such not to be the 
fact, then they would disregard the instruction as the court 
informed them to do by that part of Instruction No. 17 set 
forth above. 
It could be no more than mere conjecture to say that 
this jury did not find the defendant guilty of larceny under 
Instruction No. 7, wherein the elements necessary to con-
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stitute the offense of larceny were fully explained to them. 
The jury viewed the witness, Shonka, and they may well 
have believed nothing that came from the mouth of the de-
fendant. 
What has been said by both appellant and respondent 
on this Point II is merely argumentive; however, unless 
it is clear that the jury misunderstood the law or entirely 
ignored evidence upon a material issue, its unanimous ver-
dict, constitutionally required in criminal cases (Art. I, 
Sec. 10, Constitution of Utah), is not to be set aside or in-
terfered with for trivial or insufficient reasons. Instruc-
tion No. 8, as given, was applicable to the facts for which 
defendant contended. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury found C. Jean Shonka guilty of larceny as 
charged. Appellant makes much of the fact that the check 
stolen by Miss Shonka was taken openly to the bank where 
it was cashed. We suggest that an attempt to cash the 
check at any other place or under any other circumstances 
would have been difficult if not impossible; that the check 
was negotiated in a manner calculated to arouse the least 
suspicion; that C. Jean Shonka intended to have· the money 
for herself, otherwise she would not have concealed from 
her employers (a) that she had the check in her possession, 
(b) that she obtained cash for the check, and (c) what 
became of the money. 
The verdict should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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